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
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Russia/United Kingdom/United States War
Game (RUKUS) 95



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This memorandum reflects thoughts on naval peacekeeping and ecological disaster simulation conducted at the Admiral Kuznetsov Naval Academy, St. Petersburg Russia in April 1995. This simulation involved officers and personnel from the U.S., United Kingdom and Russia.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Russia/United Kingdom/United States (RUKUS) tri-lateral event has been an annual affair since 1988 when it began as a conference at Atterbury, UK, and by 1993 had evolved into a wargaming format. The Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, has been involved in the RUKUS process since shortly after its inception, and has continued to be the US Navy's agent in the coordination and execution of this approved military-to-military activity. In keeping with an agreed upon sequential rotation,¹ RUKUS 95 was hosted by the Russian Federation Navy (RFN) and held within the wargaming facility of the Admiral Kuznetsov Naval Academy in St. Petersburg, Russia, 18-20 April 1995, with a follow-on one-day tour of Northern Fleet facilities and assets at Severomorsk.

The Kuznetsov Academy staff, working in conjunction with the operations directorate of the Main Navy Staff, planned and designed the game. Some input was provided by US and UK delegations at a planning meeting held in St. Petersburg in November 1994. The scenario was based around the "employment of a combined naval task force to protect economic activities and shipping in a designated area." It involved tasking of a trilateral combined task force acting in support of a United Nations Security Council resolution to resolve hostilities between two island nations involved in a dispute over a recently developed undersea oil field.

Each participating navy was assigned eight billets within the game's planning and operational command structure. As host, an RFN flag officer, RADM Bessonov of the Academy staff, formerly a submarine group commander, was in charge of the

¹ Each navy hosts the event on a rotating basis. The Naval War College hosted it in 1990, 1991 and 1994 and is scheduled to host it again in 1997.

combined task force. The President of the Naval War College, RADM Joseph Strasser, who led the US delegation and was the US Navy flag participant serving as "higher authority," was joined by the UK flag participant, RADM John Trewby of the Ministry of Defense, and the RFN's VADM Yuri Kaisin of the Main Navy Staff. US participants were solicited from the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Fleet Commanders-in-Chief, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard. The US team eventually included representatives of CINCPACFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSECONDFLT, COGARDGRU New York, OPNAV, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Center for Naval Analyses and the Naval War College.

II. GAME DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

Purpose of the wargame.

The navies decided on these general purposes:

- 1) Localize and stop a military conflict in its initial phase.
- 2) Prevent an ecological disaster in a sea area.
- 3) Furtherance of military cooperation between the navies of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation in dealing with peace-making and environmental disaster prevention efforts.

Objectives of the wargame.

a. Game objectives were stated to be:

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- 1) Further exploration of a concept of combined employment of navies of the United Kingdom, United States and Russia in UN-sponsored missions.
- 2) Examine alternative combined staff structures concerned with plans for and conduct of combined operations at sea.
- 3) Determine optimum force structure to commit to combined operations seeking to protect economic activities and shipping in a local military conflict.

III. OVERALL IMPRESSIONS

General preparations and observations.

RFN personnel were warm and friendly, and much effort had obviously gone into logistics preparations for the event. Almost without exception, they were outstanding hosts who appeared genuinely interested in improving relations. While there was frequent evidence of their current financial predicament, the warm reception and attention to detail overcame almost all difficulties. While most of the senior RFN officers were positive and professional, several were very candid in one-on-one conversations and expressed their concerns for the future of their country and the diminished prestige of their military and their navy.

The cultural program involved visits to military facilities (Pushkin and Frunze Higher Naval Schools, Main Navy Museum, etc.), and lodging was provided at a hotel operated for

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the Leningrad Military District with all meals served at the Academy.

Kuznetsov Academy personnel were well prepared with a creative scenario that was properly designed to achieve the established game objectives. The planning phase was conducted with players divided into three separate groups: At-Sea Operations (USN directed), Interoperability and Support (RFN directed), and Amphibious and Landing Force Operations (RN directed). The consensus of the US delegation was that the RFN entered the game with scripted plans, in some cases even down to pre-drafted briefs for the plenary sessions. There was noticeable resistance to US and UK attempts to change elements of the plan, although their apparent inflexibility was usually overcome with a determined effort.

Actual game play was conducted using the OKEAN III simulator, an analog system less sophisticated than those typically used for wargaming by our military. Players remained in their planning groups and game play took place in the plenary room where the OKEAN large screen displays were located. Game moves were carried out with each group sequentially providing tactical recommendations to the CJTF staff at each milestone development. Simultaneous consultations and interpretations occurring at each table contributed to a noisy and often confusing game environment. Orange cell (Kuznetsov Academy wargamers) play was excellent and effectively drove game play towards the established objectives. Significant observations of RFN game decisions/ actions are as follows:

- Many US players observed that RFN participants seemed to be using scripted tactical decisions during game play. On several occasions an RFN player within a cell would recommend a very detailed

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tactical move which was not accepted by the US or UK commander of that cell. The CJTF appeared to accept the non-RFN recommendation passed from that cell, but then the action originally proposed by the RFN player (but not relayed to the CJTF), down to precise ship courses and speeds, was executed by the OKEAN system. The impression was that the move had already been programmed into the OKEAN system prior to the start of game play.

- The CJTF insisted that higher authority be collocated with him on the flagship. The impression gained was that there was an unwillingness on his part to make decisions on his own. Again, he often seemed to be playing from a pre-planned script and was sometimes resistant to act on US and UK flag input.
- While a USN LHD was included in the combined task force, it had apparently been preplanned that an RFN Udaloy would serve as flagship for the CJTF. There was strong resistance to a US and UK recommendation that the LHD, with its superior command and control suite, be assigned the flagship role.
- Most US players observed that, once the RFN players noticed that their own flag officers openly criticized them for their tactical decisions, they became very unwilling to risk further "censure." The apparent intimidation factor became significant as many of them became much less willing to be active participants in the process. The senior flag officer present at the game, ADM Ivanov, former Baltic Fleet Commander-in-Chief and incumbent

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Kuznetsov Academy Commandant, was openly critical with respect to several of the tactical actions carried out by his officers, including the CJTF (who tended to take it all with a smile, as though he was accustomed to the Admiral's style).

- It quickly became clear that the senior RFN participants were in no way convinced that they needed to consider the role of the media during planning or game play. "The media," commented one senior RFN admiral in the plenary sessions, "was the UN's problem. Operators should concern themselves only with the mission."
- Rules of engagement (ROE) developed as a result of RUKUS 94, played in Newport, appeared to have cleared up some confusion that had been encountered during that game. While the 1995 game was not played at a depth necessary to fully test them, ROE was not a subject of much game discussion. There was never an opportunity to observe the RFN reaction to political control over military activities in the ROE process.

Another consensus observation was that RFN decision-makers seemed to be more reluctant to take units under fire than UK and US counterparts, contrary to what was expected. On two occasions, in particular, when orange forces had clearly demonstrated hostile intent from the US and UK perspective and had violated an established exclusion zone, both the US and UK players strongly recommended taking the unit under fire, but RFN players were very hesitant to do so.

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IV. GAME CONCLUSIONS

The consensus opinion of US and UK participants was that RUKUS 95 was a highly successful in effort to get participants to know more about each other and improve interoperability between them. Wargame results continue to indicate that by far the biggest obstacles to successful combined operations continue to be communications (including language problems) and command and control. Time and again the subject of interpreters (locations, quantities, etc.) came up as a critical factor. Also, the need to investigate off-the-shelf communications systems, preferably ones with secure features, to share with the RFN during combined operations was clearly indicated. Several of the game's shortcomings could well have resulted from the compressed nature of the time allotted. To their credit, RFN plans were extremely ambitious for the time available.

V. NORTHERN FLEET VISIT

The wargame was followed by a 21 April visit to the main operating base of the Northern Fleet at Severomorsk. Upon arrival, a brief was given to the flag participants by the Commander-in-Chief, ADM Yerofeyev. The brief was informative, and he seemed to be fairly candid with his responses to questions. He expressed particular concern about his perception that the US Navy continues to operate its submarines in close proximity to the Russian coast. He also talked about his concern with respect to the increased number of exercises we have supposedly been conducting. In particular, he cited a recent exercise in Norway in which the armored vehicles present during the course of the exercise increased in quantity multi-fold over previous years. The atmosphere throughout the brief was friendly and positive. While the flag officers were being briefed by the CinC, the remainder of the participants were briefed by the acting

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chief of staff, RADM Titarenko. His brief was significantly less candid and provided little or no information that was not already common knowledge.

The headquarters briefs were followed by visits to a VICTOR III submarine (TAMBOV), a UDALOY ASW destroyer (ADM KHARLAMOV) and a SOVREMENNY guided missile destroyer (BEZUDERZHNY). The latter visit also included an outstanding luncheon in the wardroom hosted by the commanding officer and squadron commander. Though allowed to enter the submarine, the tour involved entry into only three compartments and, with the exception of the conn, included no tactical or operations spaces. Of note, except for the flag party, all who visited the submarine were asked to stand in a large radiation monitoring device temporarily erected under a tent on the pier for individual monitoring immediately after debarking. The surface ship tours only involved topside areas, with the exception of internal access to the wardroom and designated officer staterooms on the SOVREMENNY. The ships were in good material condition and the sailors seemed sharp and alert. RADM Strasser had visited the same location three years prior and commented that he noticed definite overall improvement in conditions. Several of the UK and US participants who had had the opportunity to previously visit RFN units of the Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific Fleets commented that they were impressed at the higher level of material readiness observed in Severomorsk. While it was obvious that a great deal of fresh paint and other last minute and sometimes superficial material improvements were made in the interest of impressing their US and UK guests, and that the majority of the RFN sailors encountered were "contract" as opposed to "conscript" sailors, most participants were still impressed at the overall condition of the ships and the sailors.

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A visit to the ADMIRAL USHAKOV (ex-KIROV) was canceled shortly before our arrival, but she and a sister ship, ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV, were moored at an adjacent pier and appeared to be undergoing extensive topside preservation. A rambunctious shipboard ceremony of some type was being conducted on NAKHIMOV's fantail and the sailors appeared to be in good spirits, seemingly enjoying the function with cheers and laughter. We were told that the UDALOY we visited had just returned from "the winter exercise," which had reportedly lasted three days, and the ship's officers talked of having conducted an exercise firing of an SS-N-14, which was verified by the blast damage aft of her starboard launcher box. We were also told that ships are normally allotted 40 days of underway operating time each year and conduct one missile firing per system in the same time frame.

VI. CONCLUSION

The consensus of the US participants was that RUKUS 95, in its totality, was a definite success. The Russians were excellent hosts, and it was obvious that they took the game very seriously and were intent on "putting their best foot forward." While it is recognized that the games are conducted in an artificial, sometimes superficial, environment, the 1995 game served to continue the process of learning more and more about how the RFN operates at the tactical level, how its senior officers think and reason in an operational environment and how the RFN operational forces are being affected by the social, cultural and economic unrest that exists in the former Soviet Union, providing another important opportunity to establish personal and professional military relationships that will be of assistance in the future. Participants agreed that it is obvious that, with each year's event, the navies become more and more capable of working with and understanding each other and that as the process continues

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participants will continue to refine interoperability procedures and broaden personal contacts. At the conclusion of the event, the head of the British delegation, RADM Trewby, announced that the Royal Navy would be hosting the following year's game at the Royal Naval College in Greenwich and at their wargaming facility at the Maritime Training School, Dryad, in Portsmouth.

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Annex A:

US Navy Game Participants

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US Navy RUKUS 95 Participants

<u>Name</u>	<u>Command</u>
RADM Joseph Strasser, USN	Naval War College
Professor Jack Grunawalt	Naval War College
CAPT Tom Fedyszyn, USN	Prospective Naval Attache, Moscow
CAPT Roger Cooper, USN	Naval Attache, Moscow
CAPT Dan Liuzzi, USN	CINCPACFLT
Col Clay Grubb, USMC	MCCDC
CAPT Tom Gilmour, USCG	COMCOGARDGRU New York and Captain of Port of New York
Mr. George Fedoroff	Office of Naval Intelligence
CDR David Burnette, USN	Naval War College
CDR Dennis Dolfie, USN	CINCUSNAVEUR
CDR Lee Ducharme, USN	COMSECONDFLT
CDR Charlie Fleischman, USN	COMSECONDFLT
Maj Arthur Corbett, USMC	OPNAV (N 3/5)

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Mr. Paul Olhovsky

Center for Naval Analyses

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